|
Rhetoric of science is a body of scholarly literature exploring the notion that the practice of science is a rhetorical activity. It emerged following a number of similarly-oriented disciplines during the late twentieth century, including the disciplines of sociology of scientific knowledge, history of science, and philosophy of science, but it is practiced most fully by rhetoricians in departments of English, speech, and communication. Rhetoric is best known as a discipline that studies the means and ends of persuasion. Science, meanwhile, is typically seen as the discovery and recording of knowledge about the natural world. A key contention of rhetoric of science is that the practice of science is, to varying degrees, persuasive. The study of science from this viewpoint variously examines modes of inquiry, logic, argumentation, the ethos of scientific practitioners, the structures of scientific publications, and the character of scientific discourse and debates. For instance, scientists must convince their community of scientists that their research is based on sound scientific method. From a rhetorical point of view, scientific method involves problem-solution ''topoi'' (the materials of discourse) that demonstrate observational and experimental competence (arrangement or order of discourse or method), and as a means of persuasion, offer explanatory and predictive power (Prelli 185-193). Experimental competence is itself a persuasive ''topos'' (Prelli 186). Rhetoric of science is a practice of suasion that is an outgrowth of some of the canons of rhetoric. ==History== Since 1970, rhetoric of science, as a field involving rhetoricians, flourished. This flourishing of scholarly activity contributed to a shift in the image of science that was taking place (Harris "Intro," ''Landmark'' xv). A conservative approach to rhetoric of science involves treating texts as communications designed to persuade members of scientific communities. This approach concerns scientific claims that are already considered true as a result of the scientific process rather than the rhetorical process. A more radical approach, on the other hand, would treat these same texts as if the science held within them is also an object of rhetorical scrutiny (Gross "Rhetoric of Science," ''Encyclopedia'' 622-623). Among those in the conservative camp, who view science texts as vehicles of communication, are Charles Bazerman, John Angus Campbell, Greg Myers, Jean Dietz Moss, Lawrence Prelli, Carolyn Miller and Jeanne Fahnestock. Bazerman's close readings of works by Newton and Compton as well as his analysis of the reading habits of physicists and others led to a greater understanding of the successes and failures of communication (Gross "Rhetoric of Science," ''Encyclopedia'' 623-624). For a depiction of the views of the more radical camp, see the section titled "Critique of Rhetoric of Science." The history of the rhetoric of science effectively begins with Thomas Kuhn's seminal work, ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'' (1962). He examines first normal science, that is, a practice which he saw as routine, patterned and accessible with a specific method of problem-solving. Building on past knowledge, normal science advances by accretions in a knowledge base (Harris "Intro," ''Landmark'' xiii). Kuhn then contrasts normal science with revolutionary science (ground-breaking science marked by a paradigm-shift in thought). When Kuhn began to teach Harvard undergraduates historical texts such as Aristotle's writings on motion, he looked to case studies, and sought first to understand Aristotle in his own time, and then to locate his problems and solutions within a wider context of contemporary thought and actions (Nickles 144). That is to say, Kuhn sought first to understand the traditions and established practices of science (Nickles 162). In this instance, Michael Polanyi's influence on Kuhn becomes apparent; that is, his acknowledgement of the importance of inherited practices and rejection of absolute objectivity. Observing the changes in scientific thought and practices, Kuhn concluded that revolutionary changes happen through the defining notion of rhetoric: persuasion (Harris "Intro," ''Landmark'' xiv). The critical work of Herbert W. Simons - "Are Scientists Rhetors in Disguise?" in ''Rhetoric in Transition'' (1980) - and subsequent works show that Kuhn's ''Structure'' is fully rhetorical. The work of Thomas Kuhn was extended by Richard Rorty (1979, 1989), and this work was to prove fruitful in defining the means and ends of rhetoric in scientific discourse (Jasinski "Intro" xvi). Rorty, who coined the phrase "rhetorical turn," was also interested in assessing periods of scientific stability and instability. Another component of the shift in science that took place in the past centres on the claim that there is no single scientific method, but rather a plurality of methods, approaches or styles (Harris "Intro," ''Landmark'' xvi). Paul Feyerabend in ''Against Method'' (1975) contends that science has found no "method that turns ideologically contaminated ideas into true and useful theories," in other words; no special method exists that can guarantee the success of science (302). As evidenced in the early theory papers after Kuhn's seminal work, the idea that rhetoric is crucial to science came to the fore. Quarterly journals in speech and rhetoric saw a flourishing of discussion on topics such as inquiry, logic, argument fields, ethos of scientific practitioners, argumentation, scientific text, and the character of scientific discourse and debates. Philip Wander (1976) observed, for instance, the phenomenal penetration of science (public science) in modern life. He labelled the obligation of rhetoricians to investigate science's discourse ' "The Rhetoric of Science" (Harris "Knowing" 164). As rhetoric of science began to flourish, discussion arose in a number of areas, including: * Epistemic rhetoric and the discourses on the nature of semantics, knowledge, and truth: One example is the Robert L. Scott's work on viewing rhetoric as epistemic (1967). By the 1990s, epistemic rhetoric was a point of contention in the writing of Dilip Gaonkar (see "Critique" below). * The early 1970s Speech Communication Conference ("Wingspread conference") gave recognition to the fact that rhetoric, in its globalization (multidisciplinary nature), has become a universal hermeneutic (Gross ''Rhetorical'' 2-5). Much scholastic output evolved around the theory of interpretation (hermeneutics), the knowledge-making and truth-seeking (epistemic) potential of rhetoric of science. * Argument Fields (part of the Speech Communication Association and American forensic Association program): In this domain the work of Toulmin on argument appeals is exemplary. In addition, Michael Mulkay, Barry Barnes and David Bloor, as pioneers of the "Sociology of Scientific Knowledge" (SSK) movement, fostered a growing sociobiology debate. Others as Greg Myers expressed the benefits of a collaboration between rhetoricians and sociologists. Contributors to discussion pertaining to audience - the way arguments change as they move from the scientific community to the public - include John Lyne and Henry Howe (Harris "Intro," Landmark xxi-xxxii). * Scientific Giants: The important works that investigate the suasive powers of exemplars in science include those of Alan Gross (Newton, Descartes, argument fields in optics), John Angus Campbell (Darwin), and Michael Halloran (Watson and Crick). John Angus Campbell's work on Charles Darwin's ''The Origin of Species'', for instance his work titled, "Charles Darwin: Rhetorician of Science" (1987), shows that Darwin was a rhetorician through and through. Campbell provided an early 'case' in support of rhetoric of science (Harris "Intro," ''Landmark'' xxx). Other major themes in rhetoric of science include the investigation of the accomplishments and sausive abilities of individuals (ethos) who have left a mark in their respective sciences as well as an age old concern of rhetoric of science - public science policy. Science policy involves deliberative issues, and the first rhetorical study of science policy was made in 1953 by Richard M. Weaver. Among others, Helen Longino's work on public policy implications of low-level radiation continues this tradition (Gross "Rhetoric of Science," ''Encyclopedia'' 622). The reconstitution of rhetorical theory around the lines of invention (inventio), argumentation and stylistic adaptation is going on today (Simons 6). The key question today is whether training in rhetoric can in fact help scholars and investigators make intelligent choices between rival theories, methods or data collection, and incommensurate values (Simons 14). 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Rhetoric of science」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
|